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ABSTRACT Evaluative sentences (moral judgments, expressions of 
taste, epistemic modals) are relative to the speaker’s standards. Lately, a 
phenomenon has challenged the traditional explanation of this relativity: 
whenever two speakers disagree over them they contradict each other without 
being at fault. Hence, it is thought that the correction of the assertions involved 
must be relative to an unprivileged standard not necessarily the speaker’s. I 
will claim instead that so far, neither this nor any other proposal has provided 
an explanation of the phenomenon. I will point out several problems presented 
by them and I will hint to how this phenomenon could be explained by making 
minor adjustments to our semantic theory.
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RESUMO Sentenças avaliativas (julgamentos morais, expressões de 
gosto, modos epistêmicos) são relativas aos padrões do falante. Recentemente, 
um fenômeno desafiou a explicação tradicional dessa relatividade: sempre que 
dois falantes discordam entre si, eles contradizem um ao outro sem estarem 
errados. Por isso, pensa-se que a correção das asserções envolvidas deve ser 
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relacionada a um padrão desprovido de privilégio e não necessariamente ao 
padrão do falante. Eu sustentarei, ao contrário, que até agora nem esta nem 
alguma outra proposta forneceu uma explicação do fenômeno. Eu assinalarei 
diversos problemas apresentados por essas propostas e sugerirei o modo 
como este fenômeno poderia ser explicado ao fazer pequenos ajustes em 
nossa teoria semântica.
Palavras-chave  Relativismo, contextualismo, desacordo, semântica.
it is no secret that the truth value of some of our everyday sentences 
can be relative somehow: sentences containing indexicals, for instance, vary 
their truth conditions alongside with the variation of the values of certain 
parameters in the context of utterance.2 But this is not the only way in which 
sentential truth value can vary. recently a fair amount of attention has been 
devoted to the truth-relativity of what i will call “evaluative judgments”:3 the 
truth value of moral judgments, sentences containing predicates of taste or 
epistemic modals and even sentences about the future seems to vary relatively 
to the value of certain parameters associated to the speaker –for instance, the 
evaluative standards she is committed to in the case of sentences containing 
taste predicates-. thus, “Feijoada is delicious” will be true if i assert it but it 
may be false if you utter it, because under my evaluative standard for food 
taste feijoada ranks high, while under yours it classifies as non-tasty. in other 
words, the same sentence will differ in truth value when asserted in different 
contexts of utterance and assessed in different circumstances of evaluation.
our current double-index semantic theories4 have plenty of resources to 
explain this truth-relativity perfectly well. However, in the last years a problem 
2	 In	what	follows	I	will	use	the	concept	of	context	used	in	double	index	semantic	theory	(see	Lewis	1998,	
Kaplan	 1977,	 1989)):	 according	 to	 it,	 the	 context of	 utterance	 is	 the	 index	 constituted	 by	 parameters	
corresponding	to	agent	or	speaker,	time	and	location	of	the	utterance	and	possible	world	of	the	utterance.	
I	will	also	refer	to	the	circumstances of evaluation,	different	from	the	context	of	utterance	but	also	an	index	
containing	at	least	one	parameter	(a	possible	world).	While	the	context	of	utterance	helps	determining	the	
semantic	content	expressed	by	the	sentence,	the	circumstances	of	evaluation	determine	the	sentence´s	
truth	value.	In	most	cases,	the	values	provided	for	the	parameters	in	both	index	are	those	in	the	context	of	
utterance.	In	both	cases	sui generis	parameters	can	be	added	if	needed	(as	happens	in	the	case	I	will	be	
considering	in	the	paper).	Note	that	contexts	of	utterance	and	circumstances	of	evaluation	differ	from	what	
MacFarlane	calls	“contexts	of	assessment”	or	“perspectives”,	constituted	by	a	possible	world	and	a	certain	
evaluative	parameter	(say,	a	standard	of	taste)	which	is	not	necessarily	that	of	the	speaker.	This	context	
or	perspective	is	used	for	assessing	the	correctness	of	assertions	of	evaluative	sentences.	The	difference	
between	the	three	of	them	is	significant	for	the	aim	of	this	paper	and	should	be	in	sight.
3	 See	for	example	García-Carpintero	and	Kölbel	(2008).
4	 I	am	referring	to	Kaplan-style	semantic	theories.	See	Kaplan	(1977,	1989)	or	Lewis	(1998).
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has been detected that could motivate the modification of some traits of these 
theories in order to fully explain the use pattern of this kind of sentences. 
the problem emerges whenever two speakers disagree over them: intuitively 
we would say that the two sentences involved (“Feijoada is delicious”, 
“no, it is not”) contradict each other or are mutually inconsistent –hence, 
there is a disagreement-. But, due to the truth-relativity of these sentences, 
both utterances appear to be expressing something true and consequently 
neither speaker can be accused of being at fault –hence, there is a faultless 
disagreement-. How can we explain this phenomenon?
A close study of the case of faultless disagreements has led to the idea 
that the correction or accuracy of the speech acts involving these sentences 
must be relative to a parameter –such as an evaluative standard- whose value 
is not necessarily linked to the speaker. in other words, even when the context 
of utterance provides a certain value to this sui generis parameter, in order 
to account for faultless disagreements we have to provide a different value 
for this parameter. thus, even when in each context of utterance and in its 
associated proper circumstances of evaluation each of the uttered sentences is 
true, the fact that they constitute a disagreement can be explained pointing at 
the fact that, from a single context (not necessarily that of any of the speakers) 
only one of the sentences is true and the other is false. this forces the appeal to 
a new context different to the context of utterance– the context of assessment 
or perspective-, constituted by the evaluative parameter with a value which is 
not necessarily that of any of the speakers, but that of the assessor. But is this 
really how it goes? in what follows i will claim that so far, none of the current 
theories on the topic has managed to provide a real solution to this problem, 
not even the radical relativism that proposed this modification. to explain 
why, i will point out several problems presented by each of these theories. 
At the end, i will provide some hint of how this problem could be solved and 
why, in order to do so, double-index semantics must be altered, even if not in 
the way suggested by radical relativism.
1. Relativity of truth and faultless disagreements
Standard semantic theories for languages with context-sensitive 
expressions5 can account nicely for truth value relativity appealing either to 
locating the relevant parameters within the context of utterance or to locating 
them within the circumstances of evaluation (see note 2). the truth value of 
5	 Kaplan,	(1977,	1989),	Stalnaker	(2007)	and	Lewis	(1998)	provide	different	variations	of	this	theory.
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certain sentences like those containing taste predicates, epistemic modals and 
moral judgments (let’s call them “evaluative judgments” even when not all of 
them depend on an evaluative parameter)6 is relative to the value of a certain 
sui generis parameter; taking the case of taste predicates as a toy example, 
the truth value of the sentence containing them will be relative to the value 
of the evaluative taste standard held by the speaker. this relativity can be 
thus explained either by locating this standard as a contextual parameter (as 
proposed by indexical contextualism)7 or as a parameter in the circumstances 
of evaluation (as non-indexical contextualism suggests).8 in the first case, the 
semantic content of the sentence is taken to contain hidden indexicals saturated 
by the value of the relevant parameter within the context of utterance or they 
are taken to express a schematic semantic content that gets enriched by adding 
to it the value of the standard parameter as a non-articulated constituent. in 
both cases, the semantic content of the sentence or what it says is something 
in the line of “Feijoada is delicious for me”. in the case of non-indexical 
contextualism, the parameter does not enter into the context of utterance but 
is located instead within the circumstances of evaluation. in that case, the 
semantic content of the sentence is just “Feijoada is delicious”, and its true 
value depends on the value given to the parameter, which is determined by the 
speaker in the context of utterance.9
the resulting truth-relativity appears also in the dimension of linguistic 
behavior: the assertions10 of these sentences are intentional acts governed by 
norms. Among them, probably the most relevant –at least to our purposes- 
is “the norm of truth”, which relates the semantic concept of truth to the 
pragmatic concept of correctness of assertions. its natural form (“assert P only 
if P is true”) can be modified to take into account the aforementioned truth 
value relativity of evaluative sentences:11
6	 The	truth	value	of	sentences	with	epistemic	modals	depends	on	the	amount	of	evidence	of	the	agent	and,	
following	Stanley	(2007),	certain	traits	of	the	context.	
7	 See	López	de	Sá	(2007,	2008).
8	 See	Lasersohn	(2005),	García-Carpintero	(2008),	Recanati	(2007,	2008).
9	 Kaplan	 (1977)	 distinguishes	 between	 proper	 and	 improper	 circumstances	 of	 evaluation:	 while	 proper	
circumstances	 are	 constituted	 by	 parameters	 (usually,	 only	 the	 possible	 world,	 but	 in	 this	 particular	
case,	 the	possible	world	plus	 the	evaluative	parameter)	whose	values	are	exactly	 those	given	 to	 those	
parameters	 in	the	context	of	utterance	(hence,	the	actual	world	and	the	taste	standard	of	 the	speaker),	
improper	circumstances	can	give	different	values	to	these	parameters.	In	the	cases	under	study,	nothing	
allows	the	construal	of	the	circumstances	as	improper	and	therefore,	the	values	given	to	the	parameters	
will	be	those	of	the	context	of	utterance.
10	 By	 “assertion”	 here	we	will	 be	 referring	 only	 to	 the	 speech	 act	 of	 affirming	 a	 particular	 content	 or	 its	
negation.
11	 Kölbel	(2009).
215THE RELaTIvITy of EvaLuaTIvE SEnTEncES: DISagREEIng ovER DISagREEmEnT
The utterance of an evaluative sentence s by a speaker S in a context c will be 
considered correct only if the content s expresses in c is true at the world of c and 
under the evaluative standard held by S.12 
thus, we can account for the truth-relativity of these sentences and also for 
the correctness-relativity of their assertion to the parameter of the evaluative 
standard of the speaker. So what is the big deal about these sentences, then?
the problem arises with faultless disagreements, disagreements over 
evaluative judgments. According to MacFarlane,13 only a radical relativist 
perspective can account for them. in order to judge whether this is true we 
should pause and reflect, first, over the nature of the problem and second, over 
what is needed to solve it.
Faultless disagreements are, first of all, disagreements. For them to exist 
two assertions are needed, one affirming the content and one negating it. if 
the sentences uttered in those assertions express two different contents instead 
of one content and its negation, the resulting exchange won’t classify as a 
disagreement but as a misunderstanding.14 on top of that, the disagreement 
has to be faultless. that is, both assertions are to be construed as correct under 
the standard of each speaker. thus, even when both assertions are correct in 
that sense, it is still the case that they are incompatible assertions, speech acts 
expressing thoughts that could not be entertained by the same speaker at the 
same moment. this is due to the fact that, assessed from only one context of 
assessment, only one of the assertions can count as correct. thus, the faultless 
part of these disagreements is based on the fact that each assertion is correct 
(according to its speaker’s standards, that is, when its truth value is evaluated 
in the proper circumstances of evaluation corresponding to the context of 
utterance) while the disagreement part answers to the incompatibility of both 
assertions, the impossibility of both speech acts being correct under one single 
standard. in order to account for a faultless disagreement we need, then, at least 
two different values to the relevant parameter or evaluative standard in play:
12	 In	what	follows	I	will	be	assuming	a	close	link	between	this	norm	of	truth	and	correctness	as	an	aim	of	
assertion,	the	former	clarifying	the	latter.
13	 MacFarlane	(in	progress).
14	 Consider,	for	example,	a	conversation	that	takes	place	between	two	speakers	located	in	different	cities:	
“Leire:	It	rains	a	lot.	/	Sebastián:	No,	it	doesn’t.”	At	first	sight,	the	exchange	looks	as	if	it	were	a	disagreement	
over	the	occurrence	of	rain	in	the	place	where	the	conversation	takes	place.	If	that	were	the	case,	we	would	
be	facing	a	faulty	disagreement,	one	in	which	one	of	the	speakers	would	be	mistaken.	But	if,	as	said,	the	
two	speakers	are	located	in	different	cities	(Leire	in	Madrid,	Sebastián	in	Buenos	Aires),	the	appearance	
is	 based	on	 a	mistake:	what	 Leire	 is	 actually	 saying	 is	 that	 it	 rains	 a	 lot	 in Madrid,	while	Sebastián	 is	
claiming	 that	 it	 isn’t	 raining	 in Buenos Aires. The	expressed	contents	are	different,	 and	 the	discussion	
occurs	only	because	Sebastián	misunderstands	Leire	as	saying	that	it	rains	where	he	is	located.	If	we	look	
for	a	disagreement	we	need	one	single	content	affirmed	and	denied	in	two	different	speech	acts.
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Alfonso: Feijoada is delicious. (true under Alfonso’s standard) (true under standard X)
nicolás: Feijoada is not delicious at all! (true under nicolás’ standard) (false under 
standard X)
only with that many standards we can account for faultless disagreements: 
even when nicolás’ and Alfonso’s assertions are true under their own standards 
(hence, faultlessness), both of them are inconsistent or contradictory under 
standard X (hence, disagreement). 
is that all there is to faultless disagreements? no. Besides this, a theory 
willing to account for the phenomenon must provide an explanation for its 
pragmatic dimension, the actual practice of faultlessly disagreeing. in this 
sense, we are facing the state in which two speakers happen to be when each of 
them contends what is said by the other. now, in some sense, there cannot be 
such a thing as faultlessly disagreeing (launching a discussion over something 
while admitting, at the same time, that the contender is right and not at fault). 
every time we engage in a discussion over an evaluative judgment we do it 
because we think we are right and our contender is wrong, and even when we 
know that she is right under her own standards, we intuitively take her to have 
committed some kind of fault.15 Since evaluative judgments are standard-
relative, we should understand that our contender is actually asserting 
correctly. But alas, she is correct under her own standards but not under ours. 
it is this assessment of the other speaker’s claim under our own standard what 
prompts us to discuss. Hence disagreements, in practice, are faulty because 
they are centered: for each of us, we are the measure of all evaluative things. 
When the moment comes to face an evaluative disagreement we will discuss 
it as if its truth could be settled down objectively.
thus, any theory willing to account for faultless disagreement must 
provide an answer to two different questions: how is it possible for an 
evaluative sentence to be assessed as correct (from the speaker’s perspective) 
and at the same time as incorrect (from the assessor’s perspective)? 
And why is it that speakers behave as if they were facing an objective 
disagreement whenever they discuss over subjectively relative sentences 
like these? in order to answer both questions, all of these requirements 
have to be fulfilled:
a. Sameness of content 
15	 We	can	either	take	it	that	our	contender	shares	our	standard	but	she	is	misapplying	it	(ascribing	a	first	order	
fault	to	her)	or	acknowledge	that	her	standard	differs	from	ours,	and	even	so	consider	that	she	is	wrong	in	
not	being	committed	to	our	own	standard	but	to	a	different	one	(ascribing	to	her	a	second	order	fault).
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b. incompatible and, at the same time, faultless speech acts (at least two evaluative 
standards in play)
c. Centered disagreements: the speaker must feel the urge to challenge what the other 
contender just said because it is wrong under her standards
now that we know what a theory accounting for faultless disagreements in 
their two dimensions should give us, let’s look at what the theories at stake do 
give us. 
2. Some closed roads
Since MacFarlane’s challenge, many philosophers have been deeply 
concerned with the problems raised by faultless disagreement. not dealing 
with them properly would be a sign of the inadequacy of traditional semantic 
theories for accounting for the use of truth-relative sentences. now, as we 
shall see, it is difficult for contextualism, either indexical or non-indexical, to 
comply with all (a), (b) and (c) above and therefore to provide an answer to 
both questions regarding faultless disagreements. 
one way of solving the problems related to faultless disagreement is, 
naturally, by denying its relevance.16 indexical contextualism does exactly 
that, and it does it at the cost of not satisfying (a) by locating the evaluative 
standard within the context of utterance and, thus, within the semantic content 
expressed by the sentence. According to López de Sá,17 an advocate of this 
alternative, evaluative judgments contain hidden indexicals which make 
evaluative sentences of the form of “X is P” equal in content18 to “X is P 
according to my standards for P-ness”.19 this move dissolves the theoretical 
import of the problem: with no single content affirmed and denied in the 
sentences in the discussion we don’t really have a disagreement at sight and, 
hence, no faultless disagreement. However, if competent speakers are usually 
aware of all the constituents of the content20 and they recognize the difference 
in the evaluative standards held by each speaker, why do they feel the urge 
to discuss? According to López de Sá this is due to the fact that evaluative 
expressions trigger a presupposition of commonality that leads the speaker 
16	 Stojanovic	(2008)	and	Iacona	(2008)	also	opt	for	such	a	denial.
17	 López	de	Sá	(2007,	2008).
18	 According	to	Kölbel’s	presentation	of	indexical	contextualism,	both	sentences	express	the	same	contents	
(2004)	 or	 are	 propositionally	 equivalent	 (2007).	 I	 would	 add,	 though,	 that	 there	 are	 conversational	
differences	between	them,	since	one	of	them	seems	more	felicitous	in	contexts	in	which	the	other	is	not	
so.	See	Kölbel	(2007).
19	 Even	if	it	is	not	without	importance,	the	discussion	over	individual	or	communal	standards	won’t	affect	the	
main	point	either	so	I	won’t	dwell	on	it.
20	 See	Orlando	(2011).
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to assume that her contender’s evaluative standard is the same than hers: 
what follows naturally is that her contender is at fault (she has misapplied the 
common standard) and has to be corrected. in López de Sá’s own terms, even 
if this fails to explain what he calls contradiction (that in any conceivable 
conversation whatsoever, it is indeed the case that utterances of (say) “a is 
good” and “a is not good” would contradict each other), it manages to explain 
what he calls genuine Disagreement (that in these conversations it is common 
ground that utterances of (say) “a is good” and “a is not good” contradict 
each other).21 According to López de Sá this is all it takes to solve the riddle 
of faultless disagreements. in actual linguistic usage all we have is Genuine 
Disagreements, while “there is no pressure to acknowledge that the alleged 
“facts” stated in Contradiction are indeed real.” (2007, 275)
Smart move, but not without problems. Claiming that an evaluative 
sentence contains, as part of its content, an evaluative standard leads to two 
unwanted consequences. First, the distortion of topic:22 intuitively, we would 
say that these discussions are over the content of the evaluative judgment 
and not, as this seems to show, over each speaker’s evaluative standards. 
Second, the impossibility of accounting for these discussions in terms of 
disagreements but only in terms of misunderstandings: it is pretty clear that 
it is not entirely rational to discuss the preferences of our contenders. the 
discussion comes from mistaking a subjective use of the evaluative predicate 
as an objective one.23 now, ascribing a systematic misunderstanding to the 
speaker’s community seems a bit too much. Speakers feel they know what they 
are doing when they launch these discussions and this should be respected.24
therefore, indexical contextualism doesn’t manage to provide a 
satisfactory account of the phenomenon. Sadly, non-indexical contextualism 
doesn’t fare any better. even though it satisfies requirements (a) and (c), it fails 
to comply with requirement (b). in this case, the evaluative standard is located 
in the circumstances of evaluation instead of being located in the context of 
21	 López	de	Sá	(2007,	275).	My	italics.
22	 Kölbel	(2008a).
23	 Iacona	(2008)	claims	 that	 there	 is	an	ambivalence	between	objective	and	subjective	uses	of	evaluative	
predicates.	Subjective	uses	are	those	by	means	of	which	the	speaker	wants	to	convey	something	like	“I	
like	dulce	de	leche	ice	cream”	and	won’t	allow	sensible	uses	of	“Feijoada	is	delicious	but	I	don’t	like	it”	
Objective	uses,	in	turn,	allow	a	sensible	use	of	this	sentence.
24	 Some	authors	have	claimed	that	speakers	are	semantically	blind	regarding	the	semantics	of	words	like	
“know”	which	work	in	a	similar	way	as	taste	predicates.	Why,	then,	should	speakers	have	a	better	grasp	
of	these	last	expressions?	To	this	objection	it	could	be	argued	that,	although	they	follow	a	similar	pattern	
(the	truth	values	of	sentences	containing	them	are	all	relative	to	the	value	given	to	a	certain	sui generis	
parameter),	not	all	the	“evaluative	predicates”	behave	exactly	in	the	same	way.	The	difference	between	the	
semantic	blindness	associated	to	“know”	and	its	absence	in	the	case	of,	say,	“tasty”,	could	be	presented	
as	one	of	these	divergences.	I	thank	the	anonymous	referee	of	Kriterion	for	this	observation.
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utterance: this avoids having the value of the relevant parameter (say, the 
evaluative standard) within the semantic content. recall that according to 
double index semantics, the context in which the truth value of the content 
of sentences is assessed is construed as an index constituted by a number 
of parameters (usually world, agent, time and location).25 in order to explain 
the truth-relativity of evaluative sentences, a sui generis parameter is added 
to this index (say, the parameter corresponding to a standard of taste). now, 
according to kaplan, the values of these parameters are fixed by the context 
of utterance: even if the parameter is located within the circumstances of 
evaluation, it takes its value from the speaker in the context of utterance. this 
is to be expected in the case of evaluative judgments, since intuitively the 
assertion of an evaluative sentence is correct if it expresses a true proposition 
according to the value of the evaluative standard held by the speaker (that 
is: “Feijoada is tasty” will be true, uttered by you, if you happen to consider 
feijoada tasty). But this prevents us from assessing any assertion from any 
standard different from that of its utterer: since the relevant value is always 
that of the speaker, an assertion cannot be assessed as incorrect if it is true 
under the standard of the speaker (that is, i wouldn’t be able to assess your 
utterance of “Feijoada is tasty” as incorrect, even if it is not tasty for me, if you 
happen to like Feijoada).26 As a consequence, this perspective cannot explain 
disagreements (which launch whenever a speaker assesses as incorrect her 
contender’s assertion). in other words, it cannot comply with (b) above, which 
demands at least two different standards in play.
Despite the struggle of these theoretical perspectives, the main answer 
continues to be that of MacFarlane’s radical relativism.27 According to it, the 
assertion of an evaluative sentence can get a deontic value (accurate/inaccurate, 
correct/incorrect) when it is assessed against any standard, not necessarily 
that of the speaker, located in a context of assessment or perspective, different 
to the context of utterance and the associated circumstances of evaluation. 
to emphasize it: non-indexical contextualism is silent on the issue of the 
assessment-relativity of assertion’s correction,28 but if it wasn’t, it should 
claim that an assertion is correct relative to the speaker’s standards. in contrast, 
25	 Lewis	(1998).
26	 It	should	be	taken	into	account	at	this	point	that	sentences	with	taste	predicates	are	toy	examples	here.	
Of	 course	 I	wouldn’t	 assess	 your	utterance	of	 “Feijoada	 is	 tasty”	 as	 incorrect	 (especially	because	 this	
sentence	usually	appeals	to	a	subjective	use	of	the	predicate.	See	Iacona,	(2008)),	but	maybe	I	would	like	
to	assess	as	incorrect	your	assertion	of	“Beating	animals	is	morally	correct”	if	it	comes	out	as	false	under	
my	moral	system	of	norms,	even	if	it	comes	as	true	under	your	own	moral	system	of	norms.
27	 MacFarlane	(2007,	2008)	and	Kölbel	(2008b).
28	 García	Carpintero	(2008).
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for radical relativism the assertion of an evaluative sentence will be correct 
or incorrect according to any standard whatsoever: there is no privileged 
standard for assessment: “what makes a view “relativist” is its relativization of 
the notion of accuracy to contexts of assessments.” (MacFarlane, 2007, 27).
instead of classifying assertions as “correct” or “incorrect”, MacFarlane 
calls them “accurate” or “inaccurate”.29 the concept of accuracy, by definition, 
is based on the potential truth value that the asserted sentence would have 
assessed in contexts other than (although not necessarily) the circumstances 
of evaluation: 
Perspectival accuracy: An acceptance (rejection) of a proposition p at a context C
U 
is accurate (as assessed from the context C
A
) iff p is true (false) at the circumstance 
〈WC
U
, SC
A
〉, where WC
U
 = the world pf C
U 
and SC
A
 = the standard taste of the 
assessor at C
A
. (2007, 26)
With this tool in hand, MacFarlane provides a nice answer to the problem, 
for, contrary to what happens in non-indexical contextualism, the assertion 
of an evaluative sentence can get two different deontic values at the same 
time: even if it is correct when assessed under the speaker’s standard, it can 
be incorrect when assessed under the assessor’s perspective (that is: your 
utterance of “Feijoada is tasty” is correct according to your taste standards but 
it is incorrect according to mine). this satisfies point (b) above, and we take 
it that (a) is covered too. But, as with contextualism, there is an Achilles heel 
for relativism too, and it is related to the choice of an unprivileged standard as 
constituent of the assessment perspective. 
remember that, in order to explain both dimensions of faultless 
disagreement, the theory should account for the fact that speakers behave, 
in engaging these discussions, as if they were objective discussions. As (c) 
claims, what is needed then is to center the disagreeing in the speaker’s 
standard. translated to MacFarlane’s lingo, (c) could be rephrased as this:
c’. Centered disagreements: the speaker must be moved to challenge what the other 
contender just said because it is inaccurate under her standards
in MacFarlane’s perspective, this means that the assessor launches a discussion 
whenever she acknowledges the inaccuracy of the speaker’s assertion under 
her own standard (i would defy your utterance of “Feijoada is tasty” if i assess 
it as incorrect under my own perspective, disregarding how it comes out under 
29	 MacFarlane	(2007,	2008).	
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yours). And apparently MacFarlane can explain precisely this: “one is entitled 
to challenge an assertion when one has good grounds for thinking that the 
assertion was not accurate (relative to the context of assessment one occupies in 
issuing the challenge), and a successful response to such a challenge consists in 
a demonstration that the assertion was, in fact, accurate (relative to the context of 
assessment one occupies in giving the response)” (2007, 28-29).30 this explains 
why it is that, in disagreeing over evaluative judgments, speakers act as they 
do when facing an objective disagreement: disagreements seem to be centered. 
But a closer look at MacFarlane’s concept of accuracy shows that this 
move is, at least, dubious. remember that an assertion is accurate whenever 
it is true in a certain perspective or context of assessment independent from 
that of the speaker, containing an unprivileged standard. this means that 
nothing anchors the standard used for the assessment to the utterer of the 
assessed sentence. And this becomes a problem because, if things are so, 
the speaker won’t know how to comply with the norm of assertion. if there 
is no privileged perspective or context of assessment then we cannot aim to 
assert accurately.
this argument was presented by evans31 against temporal relativism, and 
it was used against MacFarlane’s radical relativism by García-Carpintero32 
among others.33 According to García-Carpintero, radical relativism doesn’t 
give us solid reasons for abandoning our intuitions about intentional acts 
like assertion and correctness as an attainable goal. MacFarlane, in turn, 
acknowledges that accuracy should work as an aim of assertion34 and answers 
that “when we are talking about achieving aims, there is a privileged context 
of assessment that matters in a way that others don’t –the one occupied by 
the person who has those aims.” (2007, 27, his italics). thus, whenever a 
speaker asserts some sentence, her aim is always to assert a true (accurate) one 
according to her own standards. Problem solved.
or is it? evaluative standards seem to be playing here two different roles: 
(1) assessing the correctness of our own assertions (making correctness an attainable 
aim of assertion), and
(2) assessing the correctness of assertions performed by any speaker
30	 Following	Brandom,	1994.
31	 Evans,	G.	Does	Temporal	Logic	Rest	on	a	Mistake?	In	Evans	(1985).
32	 García-Carpintero	(2008),	who	embraces	a	moderate	relativisms	instead.	
33	 It	has	also	been	used	against	other	kind	of	relativisms,	for	example	by	Egan,	Hawthorne	and	Weatherson	
(2005).
34	 “Accuracy	 as	 aim:	We	 aim	 for	 our	 speech	 acts	 and	mental	 states	 to	 be	 accurate.	When	 they	 are	 not	
accurate,	they	have,	in	a	certain	sense,	‘misfired’.”	(2007,	27).
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radical relativism posits unprivileged standards in the role of (2): fixing 
standards to speakers in this role of assessment would ban the theory 
from explaining faultless disagreements, as happens with non-indexical 
contextualism. But the move MacFarlane seems to be doing here is to privilege 
the speaker’s standard in the role of (1), in order to gain accuracy as an aim 
of assertion. And this seems a bit tricky: this move, to relativize accuracy 
to any unprivileged standard in (2) and to unrelativize it, anchoring it to a 
privileged standard in (1), has an ad hoc flavor. now, the radical relativist 
needs to decide whether he wants to privilege the speaker’s standard for both 
roles or if he prefers not to privilege it in any of them. if he chooses the 
latter, he loses accuracy as aim of assertions and cannot account for (c). if 
he chooses the former, it is unclear why it is different from a non-indexical 
contextualism, and thus he faces the same problems this perspective has. either 
way, radical relativism doesn’t succeed in explaining faultless disagreements 
comprehensively.
3. Centered disagreement and a way out
in order to solve the problem of faultless disagreements we have to 
comply with requirements (a), (b) and (c); in terms of the roles of evaluative 
standards presented above, this implies positing the speaker’s standard in role 
(1) (in order to have faultless disagreements and correctness as an aim of 
assertion) and, somehow, positing it also in role (2) whenever the speaker 
plays the role of assessor of the utterance of others, (in order to center the 
disagreement and explain the practice of disagreeing); usually, any discussion 
between two speakers will have both of them fulfilling the role of utterer and 
also the role of assessor of the utterances of the other speaker. now, none 
of the theories involved have managed to satisfy all the three requirements 
(a) to (c). indexical contextualism refuses to satisfy (a) and loses the chance 
of giving an appropriate account of what intuitively is the topic of these 
discussions. non-indexical contextualism, by making the speaker’s standard 
play both roles, loses the chance of satisfying (b). Finally, radical relativism 
puts an unprivileged standard in charge of determining both roles. But then, 
correctness ceases to be an appropriate goal for assertion and, at the same 
time, locating the speaker’s standard as privileged in the role of determining 
correctness for assertions (role (1)) makes the theory indistinguishable from 
non-indexical contextualism. 
What should we do, then? We must look for a theory that complies with 
each point by (a) not locating the evaluative standard within the semantic 
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content, (b) providing a standard for fulfilling role (1) and a different one for 
role (2) and (c) centering this last standard in the speaker –now assessor of 
other’s utterances-. the core of the problem lies in which standard should 
determine the correctness of assertions when satisfying role (1). if it is the 
speaker’s standard, then correctness can be the aim of assertion but we lose 
the chance of explaining faultless disagreement and (b) is not satisfied. But, if 
it is an unprivileged standard, correctness as an aim for assertion would be lost 
completely. Satisfying all the requirements seems as an impossible task for a 
theory, but surprisingly it is not so.
one way of achieving this is by adjusting some technicalities of standard 
double-index semantic theories. remember that, according to them, only the 
presence of an operator justifies switching the value of a certain parameter 
in the circumstances of evaluation from that corresponding to the context 
of utterance to a different one. this prevents assessing the correctness of a 
sentence by any other standard different than the speaker’s –since no operator 
is linked to taste predicates-. Unless, of course, the context of utterance is 
expanded so as to incorporate not just a single speaker but several: all the 
speakers taking part in the dialogue.35 even though, in this case, the speaker’s 
is not necessarily the standard determining correctness, assertions can still 
aim to be correct. All the speaker has to do is to aim to assert something 
correct under his standard and/or under his contender’s. But it is questionable 
whether this solution gets things right: whenever a speaker discusses over an 
evaluative judgment it doesn’t seem to aim to assert something correct under 
her contender’s standard, especially when she assumes that her contender is 
wrong. What she seems to do is to assert what turns out to be correct under 
her own standard. 
instead, we can leave the speaker’s standard fulfill role (1) but centering 
the standard fulfilling role (2) fixing it to the speaker’s perspective: the 
speaker’s perspective becomes relevant for measuring both the correctness of 
her own assertions and the correctness of others as well. this is different from 
choosing an unprivileged standard for fulfilling this role, but it is also different 
from fixing both roles to the speaker’s standard. this move constitutes a subtle 
but helpful middle way between these options. centering the standard means, 
approximately, what MacFarlane was gesturing at above: it is the speaker’s 
standard the one that should determine the correctness of his assertions (role 
(1)), but also, the one used for the assessment of any other assertions made 
35	 This	kind	of	extended	context	has	been	proposed	by	Ninan	(2010)	and	it	is	used	by	Losada	(2011)	in	order	
to	allow	the	assessment	of	each	proposition	under	all	relevant	standards.
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by other’s (role (2)). thus, this last role is not fulfilled by an unprivileged 
standard, but from the perspective of a contender in the disagreement, who 
asserts something in it and assess what the other’s claim by means of the same 
standard: hers.
in order to understand what would be the difference between this proposal 
and non-indexical contextualism, let’s examine the issue more closely. recall 
that, according to MacFarlane, one is entitled to challenge an assertion when 
one has good grounds for thinking that the assertion was not accurate under 
the perspective one occupies in issuing the challenge. this explains why it 
is that when disagreeing over evaluative judgments, speakers act as they do 
when facing an objective disagreement: these disagreements are centered, 
for each speaker assesses the accuracy of her contender’s assertions from her 
own perspective. thus, even if the speaker understands that the contender 
has asserted a content that is accurate from his standards, she feels the urge 
to challenge it if it comes out as inaccurate under her own. this is very 
different from what is expected from a non-contextualist theory, from which 
each speaker’s claim can only be assessed as correct or incorrect from his 
or her own standards. But it is also different from MacFarlane’s own radical 
relativism, according to which the role of (2) is satisfied by an unprivileged 
standard whatsoever. So what is the difference, then, between this proposal and 
non-indexical contextualism? For non-indexical contextualism, the speaker 
must assert what is correct under her own standards and each assertion must 
be assessed under its utterer’s standard. in our proposal, the speaker must 
assert what is correct under her own standards, but in order to assess any other 
assertion she can appeal to her own standards and not to those of the speaker. 
And what is the difference between this proposal and radical relativism? 
According to the latter, the accuracy of an assertion can be measured by any 
standard whatsoever in any of its roles. in our proposal, (1) is fulfilled by the 
speaker’s standard and each contender in the discussion uses her own standard 
to assess everyone else’s assertions. We get two different standards but we 
attain a centered disagreement that can account for (a), (b) and also for (c).
in a nutshell: a way out towards a correct explanation of every dimension 
in the problems raised by faultless disagreements is to build an alternative 
position based in centering the standard in the speaker: the same standard she 
used for assert an evaluative sentence will be used to measure the correctness of 
every utterance asserted in the discussion, disregarding who the speaker is and 
what her standards are. recall that evaluative standards play the two mentioned 
roles: determining the correctness of my own assertions and assessing the 
correctness of other assertions. now, they operate in a different way in each 
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of the roles. When it is relevant to determine to assess the correctness of 
what i asserted in order to allow myself to comply with the norm of assertion 
(role (1)), the relevant standard will be the one i am committed with. But my 
standard will be used not only to assess the correctness of my own assertions 
but also to assess the correctness of every other evaluative judgment that i 
could face (role (2)). that is what it means for the standard to be centered.
4. Conclusion
the problem of faultless disagreements appears to have no clear 
solution other than radical relativism. But, as we saw, the problem is even 
much more complex than expected since it involves a series of requirements 
which must be obtained in order to reach a satisfactory explanation. now, 
most of the theories in charge of solving this puzzle cannot satisfy all of these 
requirements for some reason or other. this does not mean that the problem is 
unsolvable, though: it only means that, in order to solve it, we have to modify 
slightly certain traits of standard semantics, allowing each speaker to center 
his dealings with the usage of evaluative expressions (hers of other’s) in his 
own standard. only in this way we can have a theory complying with every 
requisite needed for solving the problem. that is, then, the road in front of us.
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